Egypt’s President Sisi’s visit strategically important for India-Egypt relations.

India has changed a lot in the last 20 years, and yet one factor in its long journey has remained almost constant: Its tradition of following a non-aligned foreign policy. The same has been spelled prominently again through the extension of invitation to Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as chief guest for Republic Day.

Earlier, similar invitations were sent to the UAE (Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 2017), the ASEAN leaders (in 2018), South Africa (Cyril Ramaphosa in 2019), and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro in 2020) by Narendra Modi government. On the back of it, this year’s invitation to President Sisi signifies a not-so-hidden agenda of forming an alliance of countries not willing to follow the diktats of either of the new poles of the New Cold War, the US-West in one side and Russia-China on the other. This is continuation of India’s role in Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of the old Cold War days.

The Sisi-Modi Summit is all the more significant because of Egypt’s growing importance at a time when the Middle East is being coalesced to form a West Asian system in which Israel is playing a pivot. With India playing a greater role, it is shaping up into an Indo-Abrahamic Alliance. Trade ties have flourished, going from $4.55 billion in 2018-19 to $7.26 billion in 2021-22, a 75% increase over the previous year, making India the third-largest export market for Egypt and its sixth-largest trade partner. Indian companies have also invested in some high-value projects in Egypt, such as the $1.5 billion.PVC and caustic soda plant in Port Said.

Bilateral defence ties are being managed through the Joint Defence Committee that, since 2006, has met nine times. Defence cooperation has included: joint exercises of the navy and air force, several training programmes, and participation in each other’s defence exhibitions. Both sides are looking at cooperation in the defence industry sector. The stage is set for the two countries to explore fresh ideas to serve their crucial security interests. The following areas are proposed:

1. The Red Sea – The Suez Canal is used by about 19,000 ships every year, which transport 12% of global trade, valued at $700 billion. About 4.8 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil is transported both ways through the canal. Of this, about 500,000 barrels/day of crude is shipped to India through the Suez Canal from the US, Latin America and Algeria. The Red Sea, with a major choke-point at each end, has already attracted several role-players that are in competition with each other. It is important that India and Egypt, having abiding and crucial interests in Red Sea security, should institutionalize their maritime cooperation, both bilaterally and at multilateral platforms, to manage regional contentions. One possibility in regard to the latter to upgrade the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as a platform to discuss Indian Ocean security issues by broadening its membership and mandate.

2. The Horn of Africa – The Red Sea littoral states of Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, taken together, constitute the “Horn of Africa”. This region over the last few decades has witnessed unrelenting violence and great suffering due to civil conflict and inter-state wars. These conflicts have resulted from fragile state formation, inter-tribal rivalries and support enjoyed by fissiparous groups from external sources. The UAE has also taken control of some of Yemen’s ports—Mokha in the Red Sea, and Aden as well as Mokalla on the Indian Ocean, and has set up an air base on Perim Island at Bab al Mandab, eight miles off the Yemeni coast. Indo-Egyptian cooperation in the Red Sea has to be integrated with addressing issues of security and stability in the Horn through a well-coordinated political and economic engagements with regional states that are complementary and mutually supportive.

3. The East Mediterranean – Though some exercises involving the Indian navy have taken place in these waters, the area has generally been outside India’s strategic space. This needs to be reviewed: the waters are not only rich in gas resources, a much-needed energy source for India, they are also the arena of diverse competitions, many of which are connected with developments in the Gulf and the Red Sea. Hence, the expansion of India’s strategic space into the East Mediterranean makes sense. Working closely with the Egyptian navy in the Red Sea and the East Mediterranean will broaden the Indian Navy’s strategic vision and maritime expertise, particularly since it would be closely linked with the security of the Red Sea.

4. Strategic partnership with Egypt – The India-Egypt cooperation agenda set out here has to be anchored in a “strategic partnership” that results from mutual confidence and a shared perspective on regional security challenges. This will facilitate bilateral initiatives to promote the inter-operability of the two countries’ armed forces, greater intelligence exchanges on regional developments, joint efforts in defence production, and working together in frontier areas involving cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and space. It will also facilitate cooperative efforts in the regions discussed above. On the other hand, India for the time being enjoys the presidency of G20, and it is likely to use it to shift the focus on the Global South, the vulnerable part of the world, particularly in the face of Climate Change that threatens the world and compels it to move towards sustainable development and measures to mitigate the damages done. Egypt, though much less powerful economically, can become an important political ally of India in this effort in the long run as it has close links to both West Asia and Africa.

Altogether, invitation to Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as chief guest for Republic Day has far reaching possibilities. How the relation will unfold is to be seen, but that the effort has begun is of immense significance.

– Jay Shah